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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS: THEIR USE AND
MISUSE IN ILLINOIS CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) takes custody of your children. They suspect you of child
abuse, or neglect, or both. Your DCFS caseworker sends you to a
psychologist for an evaluation. You talk with the psychologist, look at
inkblots,1 and take a 550 question test.2 The results of this psychologi-
cal evaluation partially determine whether DCFS recommends that
your children be returned to your custody. The results of these tests
might be admitted into evidence during various judicial proceedings.
If DCFS recommends that the court terminate your parental rights,
these results might be evidence at your trial.
In Illinois child custody determinations, psychological testimony
plays an increasingly important role. Recent literature has focused on
this type of testimony in the divorce context, however, less has been
written about the use of this testimony in child abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings. 3 This Comment discusses this important issue and provides
a possible solution to the current problems. Part II discusses United
States Supreme Court precedent and other important cases related to
both the importance of the parent-child relationship and the admissi-
bility of expert testimony.4 Part II then turns to Illinois law and ex-
plores its standard for expert testimony, details basic procedures
employed in abuse and neglect cases, and examines guidelines for psy-
chological testimony in child custody cases. 5 Part III returns to the
issue of expert testimony standards, explores the problems with
mental health testimony in general, and then discusses how these
problems affect specific cases.6 Part IV argues that the Supreme
Court's elevation of the parent-child relationship mandates a higher
standard for both the admissibility of expert testimony and its uses
when the parent-child relationship is at stake. Part IV then argues
1. The Rorschach inkblot test is discussed infra notes 126-133 and accompanying text.
2. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is discussed infra notes 134-139
and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 56, 106, and 123.
4. See infra notes 8-55 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 56-102 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 103-253 and accompanying text.
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that increasing attention must be paid to the two sets of guidelines
that deal with this testimony. 7 Finally, Part V concludes that Illinois
must adopt the Daubert test in child abuse and neglect proceedings in
order to prevent the admission into evidence of mental health testi-
mony that does not meet the appropriate standards.
II. BACKGROUND
This section addresses the history of Supreme Court decisions in the
following two areas: (1) Recognizing the importance of the parent-
child relationship; and (2) determining the standards for the admissi-
bility of expert testimony at the federal level. It then evaluates Illinois
law and discusses Illinois's standard for the admissibility of expert tes-
timony, the weight to be given such testimony in the context of In re
Ashley K, and the treatment of the parent-child relationship in child
abuse and neglect cases. This section then examines mental health
testimony in general, two psychological tests commonly employed in
child abuse and neglect cases, and guidelines for child custody
evaluations.
A. The Supreme Court and the Parent-Child Relationship
The Supreme Court has strongly and repeatedly emphasized the im-
portance of the parent-child relationship.8 It has noted that the family
relationship is protected by the Ninth Amendment and the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Supreme Court cases involving due process challenges have subse-
quently recognized the fundamental role of the parent-child
relationship.
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court held that both due
process and equal protection require courts to hold a hearing for all
similarly situated parents before declaring their children wards of the
7. See infra notes 254-279 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that "'[i]t is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."' (quot-
ing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944))).
9. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. The Court cites the following cases to support this proposition:
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (penumbral right of privacy extends to dis-
pensing contraceptives and birth control information to married people); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (forced sterilization of persons convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude violated equal protection because procreation is a "basic civil right of man"); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that laws prohibiting the teaching of subjects in
languages other than English below the eighth grade are unconstitutional. Such laws deprive
both parents and teachers of liberty without due process of law because they bear no reasonable
relation to a legitimate state purpose.).
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state. In Stanley v. Illinois,10 the Supreme Court determined that Illi-
nois courts could not deny an unmarried father a hearing on his fitness
before declaring his child a ward of the state."I While noting that the
state has an interest in removing children from the custody of neglect-
ful parents, the Court concluded that no legitimate goal was served by
separating "children from the custody of fit parents. ' 12 Therefore, Il-
linois could not presume that Stanley was unfit merely because it
thought that most unmarried fathers were unfit.13 The Court held that
due process required that Stanley receive a hearing. Further, the
Court determined that giving a hearing only to some parents and not
to others faced with the removal of their children violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14
The Court has also recognized the importance of applying procedu-
ral safeguards in parental rights termination proceedings. The Court
held that applying the preponderance of the evidence standard'15 in
parental rights termination proceedings violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The Court further stated
that a clear and convincing evidence standard' 7 passed constitutional
muster, but allowed states to set their own burdens at that level or
higher.18 The Court stated that
[tihe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, cus-
tody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply be-
cause they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State .... If anything, persons faced
with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical
need for procedural protections than do those resisting state inter-
vention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to de-
10. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Stanley was not married to the mother of his three children; thus,
when she died, they automatically became wards of the state pursuant to Illinois law. Id. at 646.
Had Stanley wished to adopt the children, he would have been treated not as a parent, but as a
stranger. Id. at 648.
11. Id. at 649.
12. Id. at 652.
13. Id. at 654.
14. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
15. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 340 (5th ed. 1999).
16. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The Santoskys' case involved ter-
minating parental rights to three of their children. Id. at 752 n.5. They also had two younger
children who were in their custody. Id. The Court mentioned in a footnote that "[alt oral argu-
ment, counsel for respondents replied affirmatively when asked whether he was asserting that
petitioners were 'unfit to handle the three older ones but not unfit to handle the two younger
ones."' Id. at 752 n.5 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg., at 24).
17. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 340.
18. Santosky, 445 U.S. at 770.
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stroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures. 19
Disallowing the preponderance of the evidence standard ensured a
higher level of protection for individuals faced with the prospect of
losing their parental rights.20 In a more recent case, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,21
the Court again commented on the seriousness of terminating paren-
tal rights. 22 The Court stated, "M.L.B.'s case, involving the State's
authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demands the
close consideration the Court has long required when a family associa-
tion so undeniably important is at stake. '23 In holding that the state
could not condition M.L.B.'s right to an appeal on her ability to pay,
the Court stated, "[W]e place decrees forever terminating parental
rights in the category of cases in which the State may not 'bolt the
door to equal justice." 24 The Court viewed termination proceedings
as "quasi-criminal" 25 and differentiated these cases "even from other
domestic relations matters such as divorce, paternity, and child
custody. 26
B. The Evolution of Federal Evidentiary Standards for
Expert Testimony
In Frye v. United States,27 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia developed a test for determining the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence. 28 In affirming the lower court's holding
19. Id. at 753-54.
20. See also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Although Lassiter held that
the court need not appoint attorneys for all indigent defendants in proceedings to terminate
parental rights, it reaffirmed the importance of the parent-child relationship: "This Court's deci-
sions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for
and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children' is an
important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection."' Id. at 27 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651).
21. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
22. Id. at 117. The plaintiff in M.L.B. sued the father of her two children. Id. at 107. The
children had been in his custody as agreed to in the divorce. Id. The father had remarried, and
the stepmother wanted to adopt the children. Id. The father and stepmother claimed that
M.L.B. had been remiss in both visitation and child support payments; M.L.B. contended that
the father did not allow her reasonable visitation. Id.
23. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 117.
24. Id. at 124 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (holding that states that grant
appellate review cannot discriminate between wealthy and indigent defendants)).
25. Id. For another case involving "quasi-criminal overtones," see Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1,
9 (1981) (holding that paternity determinations are quasi-criminal and that an indigent defen-
dant could not be denied a "blood grouping test" because of his inability to pay).
26. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127.
27. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. See generally id.
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that results of a systolic blood pressure-based lie detector test were
inadmissible, the court articulated what would become known as the
Frye general acceptance test.29 The court noted that "while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."'30 Lie de-
tector tests did not meet the general acceptance requirement. This
general acceptance test became widely used by all federal circuits and
many states, which adopted it based on their own rules of evidence.
3t
Sixteen states still expressly apply the Frye standard or a variation
thereof, including Illinois.32
A different approach to the admissibility of expert testimony was
introduced in Barefoot v. Estelle.33 In Barefoot,34 the Court held that
evidence, including expert testimony, should generally be admitted
when relevant: "[T]he rules of evidence generally extant at the federal
and state levels anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should
be admitted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the
benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing
party."'35 Under the Barefoot principle, juries, not judges, performed
most of the analysis regarding the merits of such testimony. 36
29. Id. at 1014. The defendant wished to offer testimony from a scientist who conducted the
lie detector test; the government objected. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Andrew F. Stolfi, Note, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye's General Acceptance Stan-
dard for the Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 862 (2003).
32. For a detailed discussion of evidentiary standards in state courts, see Alice B. Lustre,
Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in
State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001). See generally Stolfi, supra note 31. Stolfi suggests that
fourteen states still use Frye and three additional states have modified it. Id. at 862.
33. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
34. In Barefoot, a death penalty case, two psychiatrists who had not examined the defendant
testified in response to hypothetical questions. Id. at 885. Each answered that the defendant
would most likely commit future violent acts and remain a threat to society. Id. The American
Psychiatric Association filed an amicus brief against the use of this future dangerousness testi-
mony. Id. at 898. The Court said that flaws with this testimony are properly the subjects of
cross-examination:
Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be countered not only as errone-
ous in a particular case but also as generally so unreliable that it should be ignored. If
the jury may make up its mind about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric testi-
mony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the views of the State's psychiatrists
along with opposing views of the defendant's doctors.
Id. at 898-99. For a detailed discussion of Barefoot and its implications, see Daniel W. Shuman
& Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based Upon Clinical Judgment and
Scientific Research, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1226, 1237 (1998).
35. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898.
36. See generally id.
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Ten years later, in a radical departure from the Barefoot reasoning,
the Supreme Court gave the judge a vastly increased role-that of
gatekeeper.37 Without ever mentioning Barefoot,38 the Court in
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals decided whether Frye was
still good law in light of the recently amended Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. In Daubert,39 the Supreme Court definitively held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 70240 superseded the Frye general acceptance test.41
The Court went on to discuss its new standard: "Faced with a proffer
of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at
the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), 42 whether the expert is proposing
to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact
37. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
38. For a detailed discussion of Barefoot and its relationship to Daubert, see Michael H. Gott-
esman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753,
754-68 (1998). Gottesman discusses the changes that occurred in the ten years between Bare-
foot and Daubert. Id. at 756-57. Although not mentioned in the Court's opinion, he thinks that
mistrust of experts-for-hire led to a dramatic departure from the Barefoot reasoning. Id.
39. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. Daubert involved a suit brought by parents who claimed that their
child had suffered birth defects due to the mother's use of the prescription anti-nausea drug,
Bendectin. Id. at 582. The drug company moved for summary judgment and submitted an affi-
davit from an epidemiologist stating that no published study had ever shown Bendectin to cause
birth defects. Id. The petitioners produced eight experts who claimed that the Bendectin caused
birth defects. Id. at 583. The experts based their conclusions
upon "in vitro" (test tube) and "in vivo" (live) animal studies that found a link between
Bendectin and malformations: pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of
Bendectin that purported to show similarities between the structure of the drug and
that of other substances known to cause birth defects; and the "reanalysis" of previ-
ously published epidemiological (human statistical) studies.
Id. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the drug company because the district court
thought that the methodology of the eight experts had not gained general acceptance and there-
fore failed the Frye test. Id. After announcing the Daubert test, the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the lower court. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598.
40. FED. R. EVID. 702. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise." Id. Rule 702 was amended in 2000 in order to include reference to
Daubert-type principles. Rule 702 now includes additional language stating that scientific testi-
mony will be allowed "if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testi-
mony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." Id.
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
42. The Court stated that
"[pireliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) [pertaining to conditional admis-
sions]. In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges." These matters should be established by a preponderance of
proof.
Id. at 592 n.10 (quoting FED R. Evto. 104(a)).
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to understand or determine a fact in issue."' 43 After answering that
threshold question, the trial court should consider the following four
factors to determine whether scientific evidence is admissible: (1)
Whether the methodology has or can be tested; (2) whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3)
the known or potential error rate; and (4) whether the theory or meth-
odology has obtained general acceptance in the scientific commu-
nity.44 These criteria do not have to be met individually. Instead, the
trial court should look to them collectively before rendering its deci-
sion; the "overarching subject is scientific validity. ' 45 Daubert now
governs federal proceedings and the proceedings of those states that
have adopted the federal rules, yet Frye remains good law in other
states.
46
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court clarified the proper in-
terpretation of Daubert. First, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,47 the
Supreme Court held that a trial court's ruling on whether to exclude
expert testimony under Daubert should be reviewed under the abuse
of discretion standard. 48 Many circuit courts had been using a stricter
standard; Joiner ended the controversy. 49 However, the Court also
cautioned judges against taking their "gatekeeping" function lightly:
"[N]either the difficulty of the task nor any comparative lack of exper-
tise can excuse the judge from exercising the 'gatekeeper' duties that
the Federal Rules of Evidence impose .... To the contrary, when law
and science intersect, those duties often must be exercised with special
care."'50 Second, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,51 the Court held
that the Daubert standard applied to all expert testimony, scientific or
43. Id. at 592.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 594.
46. See generally Lustre, supra note 32.
47. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Joiner worked as an electrician and often dealt with a fluid that was
later found to contain polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB). Id. at 139. Joiner developed lung cancer
and sued his company, alleging that PCB exposure caused his cancer. Id. The district court
granted summary judgment against Joiner because "the testimony of Joiner's experts had failed
to show that there was a link between exposure to PCB's [sic] and small-cell lung cancer." Id. at
140. The district court did not admit testimony by Joiner's experts because it thought that the
testimony was not sufficiently reliable. Id. The appellate court reversed, stating that the testi-
mony should have been admissible; its reliability was a matter for the jury. Id. at 141. The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-47.
48. Id. at 141.
49. Gerson H. Smoger, From Rule 702 to Daubert to Joiner to Kumho Tire: A Review of the
Supreme Court's Analysis of the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, ATLA-CLE, Winter 2001, at
467.
50. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 148.
51. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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not.5 2 Because no clear lines exist between scientific knowledge and
other specialized knowledge, to hold otherwise makes it practically
impossible for judges to exercise their "gatekeeping" function. 53
Kumho Tire expanded the judge's gatekeeper role and gave the judge
increased control over expert witnesses.5 4 It also provided litigators
with more leverage to challenge the credibility of the expert
testimony.55
C. Illinois: Expert Testimony Standards and Their Implications for
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases
This section first discusses the Illinois standard for general expert
testimony. Second, it discusses Illinois's treatment of the parent-child
relationship under the Juvenile Court Act. Third, this section exam-
ines the standards for expert testimony specific to child abuse and
neglect cases. Finally, it examines uses of psychological evaluations.
1. Expert Testimony Standards in Illinois
Illinois continues to be viewed as a Frye state; however, the law is
somewhat ambiguous. 56 The first Illinois Supreme Court case men-
tioning Frye was People v. Baynes in 1981.57 Most Illinois courts con-
tinued to apply the Frye standard, and attempts to modify it were
quickly rejected. 58
52. Id. at 141.
53. Id. at 148 (referencing Daubert). For a discussion of the implications of Kumho Tire and
other standards for determining the admissibility of expert testimony based other than on hard
science, see Emily J. Baggett, The Standards Applied to the Admission of Soft Science Experts in
State Courts, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 149 (2002), and Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride
of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the "Gate-
keeper" Function to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho's Expansion of
Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689 (2001). The Kumho Tire plaintiffs brought suit against a tire
manufacturer, alleging that a defective tire caused injuries and death. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at
142. An engineer testified that the tire was defective and used the analysis of tire treads and
other technical concepts to make his argument. Id. The thial court excluded his testimony be-
cause it did not think it met the Rule 702 admissibility standard. Id. at 145. The appellate court
reversed, stating that it was inappropriate to use Daubert-type analysis when the proffered testi-
mony is technical, not scientific. Id. at 146. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the district
court reasonably found the engineer's methodology insufficiently reliable and did not abuse its
discretion by excluding it. Id. at 158.
54. See generally Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137.
55. Morsek, supra note 53, at 734-38.
56. See Thomas A. Gionis & Anthony S. Zito, Jr., A Call for the Adoption of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 for the Admissibility of Mental-Health Professional Expert Testimony in Illinois
Child-Custody Cases, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 14 (2002).
57. People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (1981), cited in William A. Schroeder, The Future of
Frye in Illinois, 82 ILL. B.J. 488-89 (1994).
58. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 54:971
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For example, in Harris v. Cropmate, an Illinois appellate court ar-
ticulated a "Frye plus reliability" standard for the admission of novel
scientific evidence. 59 This standard recommended that a trial court
undertake six inquiries into the adequacy of the scientific evidence.
60
Four inquiries dealt with the nature of the evidence being offered and
the fifth asked whether the evidence met the Frye admissibility stan-
dard. 61 The sixth and final inquiry looked to reliability, for which the
trial court could examine six factors, including the Daubert factors.
62
But the Illinois Supreme Court soon rejected this standard and, in
Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.,63 "emphatically de-
clared that 'Illinois law is unequivocal: [T]he exclusive test for the ad-
mission of expert testimony is governed by the standard first
expressed in Frye v. United States.'64
2. The Best Interests of the Child Standard and the Juvenile Court
Act
6 5
In making custody determinations, Illinois uses the best interests of
the child standard: "Upon a petition for restoration of a minor to the
custody of the parents the issue that singly must be decided is the best
interest of the child."' 66 Despite the importance of the parent-child
59. Harris v. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d 55, 60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); see also Stolfi, supra note 32, at
884.
60. See Stolfi, supra note 32, at 884 (citing Harris, 706 N.E.2d at 59-65).
61. Harris, 706 N.E.2d at 60-64. The first four inquiries are: (1) "Precisely what evidence is
being proffered?" Id. at 60. (2) "Will the proffered testimony assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or determine facts in issue, or can the trier of fact use its own knowledge and
experience?" Id. (3) "[D]oes the proffered testimony constitute 'scientific' evidence?" Id. (4)
"[l]s that scientific evidence 'novel?"' Id. at 62.
62. Id. at 64-65.
63. 767 N.E.2d 314 (I11. 2002).
64. Stolfi, supra note 32, at 886 (quoting Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 323).
65. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1987, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-1-7-1 (2003),
describes in detail the various stages of and requirements for child abuse and neglect
proceedings. After the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) is granted
guardianship in a case, the major stages are: disposition, adjudication, first permanency hearing,
and subsequent permanency hearings every six months. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-1-2-33.
66. In re Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d 905, 923 (I11. App. Ct. 1991). For a discussion of potential
ramifications of Ashley K, see H. Joseph Gitlin, Defining the Best Interest of Children: Parents v.
Others in Custody Proceedings, 79 ILL. B.J. 566 (1991). Gitlin also discusses the standards that
existed prior to the best interests of the child standard. Id. For example, the tender years doc-
trine gave strong support to the idea that every child needs his or her mother during his or her
formative years. Id. at 566-67. This doctrine is explained in Nye v. Nye, 105 N.E.2d 300, 303
(1952): "The maternal affection is more active and better adapted to the care of the child. Espe-
cially is this true in the case of a minor daughter, where the care and guidance of a mother's
hand is doubly important." Gitlin, supra, at 567 (citing Nye, 105 N.E.2d at 303). Gitlin's article
discusses the evolution of the best interests of the child standard, the superior parental rights
doctrine, and other relevant topics. See generally id. For another discussion of the tender years
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relationship, "The best interest of the child takes precedence over
even a natural parent's superior right to custody of his child."'67 The
Illinois Juvenile Court Act clearly states: "The parents' right to the
custody 68 of their child shall not prevail when the court determines
that it is contrary to the health, safety, and best interests of the
child." 69
3. Deference to Medical Testimony
In the In re Ashley K case, an Illinois appellate court described the
expected weight to be given to expert testimony in child abuse and
neglect cases.70 In addition to the specific holding regarding Ashley,
the court articulated a new policy concerning expert testimony:71
Expert medical testimony and medical evidence are by their nature
too recondite to be refuted by non-medical testimony .... The cir-
cuit court cannot disregard expert medical testimony that is not
countervailed by other competent medical testimony or medical evi-dence. Moreover, the circuit court, itself, cannot second-guess med-
ical experts. If the circuit court does not follow medical evidence
that is not refuted by other medical evidence, the circuit court is
acting contrary to the evidence. 72
The Ashley K 73 opinion is also important because it reemphasized
that parents' rights to care for and retain custody of their child do not
doctrine, see MELVIN G. GOLDZBLAND, CUSTODY CASES AND EXPERT WITNESSES: A MANUAL
FOR AVORNEYS 17 (1988).
67. In re Violetta B., 568 N.E.2d 1345, 1352 (111. App. Ct. 2001).
68. For a concise discussion that cites key decisions regarding the parental right to custody in
Illinois, see HORNER PROBATE PRAC. & ESTATES § 886 (2003).
69. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2(3)(c) (2003).
70. See generally Ashley K, 571 N.E.2d 905. Illinois is not the only state to afford great defer-
ence to mental health testimony in abuse and neglect cases. California cases in particular are
replete with mentions of psychological testing and evaluations. See, e.g., Jesse B. v. Super. Ct.,
No. H024925, 2002 WL 31781134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Laurie S. v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d
506 (Ct. App. 1994).
71. See generally Ashley K, 571 N.E.2d 905.
72. Id. at 930.
73. Id. at 906. Ashley K involved an appeal from a circuit court order that prohibited Ashley
from receiving therapy and also prohibited visitation between Ashley and her former foster par-
ents with whom she had lived for over five years before returning to her birth parents. Id.
Ashley was originally placed with a foster family because she was born addicted to heroin, her
mother prostituted herself to maintain her drug habit, and Ashley's siblings had open cases with
DCFS due to unsafe living conditions. Id. During the next few years, Ashley's parents contin-
ued to use drugs, had trouble with the law, and visited Ashley sporadically. Id. at 908. When
Ashley turned three, things began to change. Ashley K, 571 N.E.2d at 908. The mother enrolled
in drug treatment programs and visitation increased; however, Ashley's behavior deteriorated.
Id. at 1210. A hospital evaluated Ashley and recommended that she remain with her foster
parents and move toward adoption. Id. at 1210. In contrast, DCFS continued to recommend
that Ashley return home. See generally id.
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take precedence over the best interests of the child standard as out-
lined in the Juvenile Court Act.74
At least one Illinois appellate court attempted to limit the scope of
the Ashley K decision. In the case In re C.B.,75 Dorothy Petty, the
maternal grandmother of C.B., appealed from a judgment granting
permanent guardianship to a non-relative, Tonya Wood. 76 Because of
the custody dispute, DCFS requested psychiatrists to conduct a psy-
chiatric evaluation of the involved parties prior to determining perma-
nent custody.77 A child psychiatrist with thirty years of experience,
Dr. J. Hirsch, performed the evaluation along with an assistant, Dr.
Defne Dursunkaya, who had completed four years of residency.
78
The evaluation consisted of observing Wood and C.B. together for
two one-hour sessions, and Petty and C.B. together for one one-hour
session. 79 At the first session, the therapist mainly gathered back-
ground information.80 At the second, the assistant performed further
Other evaluations were conducted, and at a hearing in 1989, two psychiatrists testified against
returning Ashley home to her parents. Id. at 912. Dr. L. David Sinn, who was board certified in
psychiatry, testified: "I believe it is in her best interest to remain in the Procopios' home." Id.
He explained his reasons at length and included the comments: "It has been my experience
working with older children and young adults who have had this happen to them that it contin-
ues to haunt them. They have difficulty making a relationship because of the fear that it will
always be taken away." Ashley K, 571 N.E.2d at 912. A second expert, Paul Fitzgerald, who had
been treating Ashley for more than six months at Community Family Services, agreed with this
recommendation. Id.
DCFS then asked Anne M. Brown, Ph.D., a psychologist, to interview all parties and to pre-
pare a report for the court. Id. at 913. Brown recommended that Hephzibah Children's Associ-
ation, a child welfare agency, assess the situation and then recommend whether the child should
remain in foster care or return to the natural parents. Id. at 912. The court noted with disap-
proval that DCFS acted on this recommendation rather than that of Dr. Zinn. Id. It also noted
that Ashley was happy with her foster family, yet despite this, DCFS and Hephzibah recom-
mended that Ashley be transferred to their shelter as an intermediate step. Id. at 914. Ashley
eventually returned home. Ashley K, 571 N.E.2d at 915.
74. Gitlin, supra note 66, at 570.
75. 618 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
76. Id. Prior to the formal guardianship decision, C.B. had lived with his mother and Petty
together, then later with Wood and the mother. Id. at 599. The mother eventually left C.B. with
Wood and moved away from Illinois. Id. at 600. During this time period, C.B. spent weekends
with Petty, and Petty financially supported the child to some degree. Id. The relationship be-
tween C.B. and Wood, initially informal, changed when Wood realized that the mother was not
going to return. Id. Petty informed DCFS-affiliated personnel of the situation and expressed
her intention to adopt C.B. and C.B.'s two siblings. In re C.B., 618 N.E.2d at 600. At a wardship
hearing, of which Petty was unaware, the court granted Wood temporary private guardianship.
Id. Once Petty became aware of the situation, she petitioned to vacate the private guardianship
order. Id.
77. Id. at 601.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. In re C.B., 618 N.E.2d at 601.
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observations and obtained more background information.81 A written
report, according to the court, "conclude[d], in a single paragraph,
that C.B. was 'clearly attached' to Wood, his primary caretaker, and
that disruption of this bonding at the 'current sensitive period' of
C.B.'s psychological development would be detrimental."82
When questioned by the court, both doctors said that additional ob-
servations would not have changed their opinions because of the "the-
ory and belief that the psychological development of a child can be
permanently impaired or damaged if that child is removed from his
primary caregiver during the critical developmental period between
the ages of 6 months and four years."' 83 The trial court accepted this
decision and the reasoning behind it because it thought that Ashley K
required it to accept uncontradicted expert testimony.84 The appel-
late court reversed, stating, "In the present case there was no compe-
tent medical evidence to indicate that C.B. would be at risk if custody
was transferred to his grandmother. Drs. Hirsch and Dursunkaya
merely applied the theory of psychological parenting in the abstract,
without any basis in fact for doing so. '"85 The appellate court's deci-
sion articulated the principle that while competent medical testimony
based on the facts of an individual case may not be disregarded, broad
psychological principles not adequately keyed to specific circum-
stances can be challenged. 86
4. Current Practice in Cook County: Psychological Evaluations and
Testimony
Psychological evaluations can be used during many stages of child
abuse and neglect proceedings. 87 They may be ordered prior to deter-
mining whether supervised or unsupervised visits should occur, and if
such visitations should occur, how they should be supervised. 88 They
also play into the ultimate determinations, such as permanency
goals.89 The evaluations are typically performed by an agency that has
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 605.
86. Gionis and Zito, supra note 56, argue that adopting Rule 702 would force judges to make
sure that expert testimony and evidence is not only "reliable, [but also] sufficiently tied to the
facts of a particular case, and properly applied." Id. at 62. "That should greatly inure to the true
best interest of a child involved in a custody dispute." Id. at 70.
87. Interview with Sheryl Buske, Legal Writing Instructor, DePaul University College of Law,
former Department of Children and Family Services counsel in Chicago, Illinois (Nov. 1, 2003).
88. Id.
89. Id. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28 (2001).
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a contract with DCFS.90 The completed evaluation is part of the court
file and can be viewed by the other parent, attorneys, and other inter-
ested parties. 91
D. Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations
Guidelines developed by the American Psychological Association
(APA) 92 and the Association of Family Conciliation Courts (AFCC)9 3
provide standards for evaluators engaged in child protection and child
custody disputes. These comprehensive guidelines discuss how to
avoid many of the common pitfalls associated with the use of psycho-
logical testimony.
The APA's guidelines 94 discuss different challenges evaluators face
and how best to respond to those challenges. For example, one guide-
line discusses the proper role of the evaluator:
In performing protection evaluations, psychologists do not act as
judges, who make the ultimate decision by applying the law to all
relevant evidence, or as advocating attorneys for any particular
party. Whether retained by the court, the child protection agency,
the parent(s) or the guardian ad litem for the child, psychologists
should strive to be objective. Psychologists rely on scientifically and
professionally derived knowledge when making judgments and de-
scribe fairly the bases for their testimonies and conclusions. 95
90. Interview with Sheryl Buske, Legal Writing Instructor, DePaul University College of Law,
former Department of Children and Family Services counsel in Chicago, Illinois (Nov. 1, 2003).
91. This practice violates the confidentiality rules traditionally associated with the relationship
between mental health professionals and their clients.
92. American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Psychological Evaluations in Child
Protection Matters, available at http://www.apa.org/practice/childprotection.htm (last visited Feb.
1, 2005) [hereinafter APA].
93. Association of Family Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice for Child Custody
Evaluations, available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/Child ModelStandards.pdf (last visited
Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter AFCC].
94. APA, supra note 92.
95. Id. at Guideline 4.
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These guidelines also caution against bias96 and overinterpreting
clinical or assessment data,97 and recommend that the psychologist
performing such evaluations gain specialized competence. 98 Both sets
of guidelines urge evaluators to use multiple methods of data
collection. 99
One of the APA guidelines stresses that certain procedures must be
employed when giving the evaluations to the courts:
Psychologists refrain from drawing conclusions not adequately sup-
ported by the data. Psychologists interpret any data from interviews
or tests cautiously and conservatively, strive to be knowledgeable
about cultural norms and present findings in a form understandable
to the recipient. Psychologists strive to acknowledge to the court
any limitations in methods or data used. In addition, psychologists
are aware that in compelled evaluations the situation may lend itself
to defensiveness by the participant, given the potentially serious
consequences of an adverse finding. Consequently, the situational
determinants should be borne in mind when interpreting test
findings.100
The AFCC guidelines discuss psychological testing and suggest that
whatever test is used, the primary concern of the overall evaluation
process should be parenting capacity. 10' If psychological test results
96. Guideline 7 states:
Psychologists engaging in psychological evaluations in child protection matters are
aware of how biases regarding age. gender, race, ethnicity. national origin, religion,
sexual orientation, disability, language, culture and socioeconomic status may interfere
with an objective evaluation and recommendations. Psychologists recognize and strive
to overcome any such biases or withdraw from the evaluation. When interpreting eval-
uation results, psychologists strive to be aware that there are diverse cultural and com-
munity methods of child rearing, and consider these in the context of the existing state
and Federal.[sic] laws. Also, psychologists should use, whenever available, tests and
norms based on populations similar to those evaluated.
Id. (footnote omitted).
97. Id.
98. APA Guideline 6 states: "Competence in performing psychological assessments of chil-
dren, adults and families is necessary but not sufficient." APA, supra note 92, at Guideline 6.
The guidelines recommend education, training, experience and/or supervision in forensic prac-
tice, child and family development, child and family psychopathology, the impact of separation
on the child, the nature of various types of child abuse and the roles of human differences,
applicable legal standards and procedure, and scientific and clinical standards for data collection.
Id.
99. AFCC, supra note 93, states: "In general, as diverse a number of procedures for data
collection as possible and feasible to the specific evaluation is encouraged. These may include
interviewing, observation, testing, use of collaterals, and home visits." Id. pt. III. Similarly, the
APA's guidelines urge multiple methods of data gathering: clinical interviews, observation and
psychological testing, reviewing relevant reports, and observing the parent-child interaction
when not prohibited by the court or safety concerns. APA, supra note 92.
100. Id. at Guideline 13.
101. AFCC, supra note 93.
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form a significant portion of the final report, the limitations of such
testing should be included with the report.
10 2
III. ANALYSIS
This section revisits Frye and Daubert, and discusses the strengths
and weaknesses of each. It then discusses problems with mental
health testimony generally and analyzes five Illinois child abuse and
neglect cases involving testimony or reports by mental health
professionals.
A. Frye and Daubert Revisited
Proponents of Frye argue that its use of only one factor, general
acceptance, 10 3 increases the "likelihood of uniform rulings.' 0 4 Fur-
thermore, the proponents commend Frye's use of the qualified opin-
ions from the relevant scientific community in order to assist the trial
judge with admissibility decisions. 0 5 Frye's opponents argue, how-
ever, that general acceptance does not necessarily guarantee
reliability.106
In contrast, Daubert's critics argue that it is based on a flawed as-
sumption "that trial judges, as gatekeepers, can effectively and compe-
tently apply their level of scientific knowledge to determine the
reliability of all sciences, currently known to mankind, as well or con-
ceivably better than each individual well-credentialed scientist who
proffers their evidence."' 01 7 Such critics argue that the relevant scien-
102. Id. For examples of well-crafted custody evaluations, albeit in the divorce context, see
PHILIP MICHAEL STAHL, CONDUCTING CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE 217 (1994).
103. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
104. William A. Schroeder, The Future of Frye in Illinois, 82 ILL. B.J. 488, 490 (1994).
105. For an interesting discussion of how the differences between Frye and Daubert play out
in the criminal context, see Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Infor-
mation in Criminal Trials from Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 100
(1999).
106. See Laura Callahan, Comment, Controversial Scientific Evidence: When the Victim Is a
Child, Shouldn't We Daubert Rather Than Frye?, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 1019 (2003): see also
Daniel W. Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say About "The Best
Interests of the Child?" An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence 31
FAM. L.Q. 551, 556 (1997). Shuman suggests three ways in which Daubert improves upon Frye:
(1) by attempting to define "science;" (2) by making judges, not scientists, responsible for polic-
ing admissibility; and (3) by providing a way to analyze admissibility that is more than "mere
popularity." Id.
107. Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner, Kumho
Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. REV. 87, 106
(2001); see also Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Dabuert and the Law's
Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913, 919 (1994); Daniel W. Shuman, The Impact of Daubert and Its
Progeny on the Admissibility of Behavioral and Social Science Evidence, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
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tific community is more qualified than the judiciary to make such
judgments.108
B. Psychological Evaluations: Potential Pitfalls
This section discusses three potential problems with mental health
testimony. First, the observations of mental health professionals,
while often considered highly reliable, can also be seriously flawed.
Second, when such testimony is made in the context of child abuse
and neglect cases, concerns about bias related to class, race, and gen-
der arise. Third, psychological tests often are interpreted by courts to
provide information beyond their proper scope. Consequently, the ju-
dicial deference afforded to mental health professionals cannot be
justified.
1. Problems with the Observations of Mental Health Professionals
Generally
Psychologists and psychiatrists often make judgments that are based
on only a fraction of the available data, which can seriously affect
their ultimate judgments. 109 Clinicians tend to form a hypothesis and
then seek information that confirms it, while not using contrary
information.110
For example, "[i]f the situation is one associated with pathology
(e.g., the client is admitting distress), counselors are prone to search
for information indicative of pathology and then interpret this infor-
mation as indicative of more pathology tha[n] may exist.""' Since
psychological evaluations are usually ordered when a judge,
caseworker, or attorney exhibits concern about a parent's mental
health, the situation becomes "one associated with pathology."11 2
Consequently, overpathologizing the parent is a real danger.
This general tendency towards hypothesis confirmation increases
when socioeconomic indicators are known: "Clinicians tend to view
& L. 3 (1999). Shuman discusses the problem of judges' insufficient expertise to evaluate mental
health and other types of social science testimony, but views Daubert as providing a charge to
behavioral scientists: It invites them to critically examine their own judgments to see if those
judgments exceed their area of scientifically based expertise. Id. Shuman has an optimistic out-
look as to Daubert's eventual impact: "Perhaps this is one area where the law may ultimately
lead the way in improving professional and scientific practices." Id. at 14.
108. See generally Shuman, supra note 107.
109. Terrence J. Tracey & James Rounds, Inference and Attribution Errors in Test Interpreta-
tion, in SCIENTIST-PRAC-TITIONER PERSPECTIVES ON TEST INTERPRETATION 113, 121-22 (James
W. Lichtenberg & Rodney K. Goodyear eds., 1999).
110. Id. at 114-15.
111. Id. at 116.
112. Id.
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the poor, members of lower social classes, people of color, and fe-
males as having greater pathology."' 1 3 Since the vast majority of indi-
viduals involved with child protection services fall into one of these
categories, the dangers are especially grave.'
14
Because clinicians may focus only on confirmatory information,
they inaccurately find confidence in their decisions.115 Research has
shown that clinicians, like laypersons, exaggerate confidence in their
knowledge.1 16 Thus, when clinicians testify or submit a report, they
might assert more confidence in their conclusions than is scientifically
warranted.11 7
The judgments of clinicians in clinical settings can certainly be ques-
tioned.'18 Literature on the topic reveals that "expert judgments that
are clinically derived, as opposed to actuarially derived, 119 are as sus-
ceptible to error as lay judgments, and that clinical decision makers,
like untrained lay decision makers, use strategies (or heuristics) in ar-
riving at decisions that contribute to the error rate. '1 20 Two commen-
tators suggest that if a psychiatrist has a preconceived outcome in
mind, he or she can manipulate the data so that it points to the desired
conclusion.' 21 This may be accomplished by "taking only a selective
history, or by selectively examining the subject's mental state, or by
failing to order needed tests. ' 122
113. Id.
114. See generally Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender,
Race, and Class in the Child Protection System: An Essay, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577 (1997). For a
discussion of the additional hurdles poor parents face in the child welfare system, see Kathleen
A. Bailie, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and
the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FOROHAM L. REV. 2285 (1998). Professor
Bailie argues that because of these barriers, lawyers who represent the parents should have spe-
cialized training in the field, including aspects of social work and psychology that are relevant to
abuse and neglect proceedings. Id. at 2324.
115. Tracey & Rounds, supra note 109.
116. ScoTr T. MEIER, THE CHRONIC CRISIS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT AND ASSESS-
MENT: A HISTORICAL SURVEY (1994).
117. Id.
118. See Gionis & Zito, supra note 56. These commentators suggest that three "common
errors include: (1) an overestimation of the clinician's knowledge about a decision; (2) attribut-
ing causality on the basis of the clinician's own subjective framing of the information; and (3)
making stereotypical decisions by reviewing and selecting data to support preconceived conclu-
sions." Id. at 13.
119. For a discussion of clinical versus actuarial predictions, see William M. Grove & Paul E.
Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical,
Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 293 (1996).
120. See Shuman & Sales, supra note 34, at 1228.
121. Ansar M. Haroun & Grant H. Morris, Weaving a Tangled Web: The Deceptions of Psychi-
atrists, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 227, 235 (1999).
122. Id.
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2. Psychological Testing
When psychological tests are based on objective measures instead
of subjective impressions they can provide useful, scientifically based
information. While tests may effectively diagnose certain mental ill-
nesses, they do not directly measure the effects of such a diagnosis on
parenting capacity. Furthermore, not all psychological tests can be
truly objective, scientifically based tests. Although they can provide a
standard procedure for evaluations, and thus ensure that relevant in-
formation comes to light, the tests do not measure parental fitness
directly. 123 Furthermore,
psychological testing usually does not, nor is it designed to, provide
data that are directly relevant to the immediate legal issue. Rather,
testing can provide information relevant to the threshold issue of
mental or emotional disturbance or personality functioning; the
causal connection between this threshold and the functional, legally
relevant behavior remains to be determined. 124
Thus, psychological test results should be accompanied by an explana-
tion of what the results mean and how the results correlate with
parenting capacity. 125
Some psychological tests might not even be admissible under the
Daubert standard. Critics of one such test, the Rorschach inkblot
test,126 argue that its scoring "method is so flawed that the results are
unreliable and probably invalid, thus making any expert testimony
opinion derived from the TRACS 127 system inadmissible under
123. Kirk Heilbrun, Child Custody Evaluation: Critically Assessing Mental Health Experts and
Psychological Tests, 29 FAM. L.Q. 63 (1995). Heilbrun suggests that adoption of the following
guidelines would prevent inappropriate uses of psychological testing: (1) selecting only commer-
cially available tests accompanied by a manual explaining "development, psychometric proper-
ties, and procedure for administration;" (2) ensuring that the test is reliable (reliability
coefficient of .8 or greater); and (3) selecting a test relevant to a legal issue and having this
relationship supported by "validation research published in peer-reviewed journals." Id. at 73-
75. Furthermore, test administration must be standardized by the individual practitioner and the
psychological community as a whole. Id. at 76.
124. Id. at 73. "There is no test for parental capacity.... Testing can provide information
relevant to the threshold issue of mental or emotional disturbance of personality functioning.
Usually, that data is not directly relevant to the legal issue." ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE
LAW, A JUDGES GUIDE: MAKING CHILD-CENTERED DECISIONS IN CUSTODY CASES 89 (2001)
[hereinafter ABA].
125. See ABA, supra note 124, at 89.
126. The Rorschach, another type of psychological test, consists of "10 bilaterally symmetrical
inkblots placed on individual 5-by-9-inch cards." KEVIN R. MURPHY & CHARLES 0. DAV-
ISHOFER, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 87 (2001). During the test,
the examiner asks the person to look at each card, convey everything seen, and return the card.
Id. at 393. The examiner then classifies responses according to location, determinants, and con-
tent. Id. at 394.
127. TRACS is an acronym for "The Rorschach: A Comprehensive System."
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Daubert.' 28 There are many potential problems with using the Ror-
schach in custody determinations. 129 First, one person's response can
be interpreted to indicate severe psychopathology. 130 This goes
against a "well accepted maxim in psychology that a single piece of
data should not be the basis for determining psychopathology." 31 In
general, the Rorschach tends to overstate psychopathology.132 Sec-
ond, "[n]o studies correlate personality attributes identified by the
Rorschach with good parenting. '133
One scholar, Jonathan Gould, contests the use of another test, the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) 34 in child cus-
tody determinations. Gould analyzed a specific case in order to ex-
plore problems with using MMPI results in child custody
determinations. He suggested that both the trial court and appellate
court worked on flawed assumptions when discussing MMPI re-
suits. 135 He argued that
the court operated under the assumption that the MMPI data pro-
vided some useful information about parenting capacity or compe-
tencies. Thus, the appeals court rendered a decision about
termination of parental rights, basing its finding, in part, on the evi-
dence entered into the record by the psychologist about the MMPI
results. 136
Another scholar, Daniel W. Shuman, sharply criticizes the current use
of MMPI results.137 He states that
[g]iven the frequency with which the MMPI is administered in cus-
tody litigation, the fervor that often characterizes custody litigation,
128. Steven K. Erickson, Psychological Testimony on Trial: Questions Arise About the Validity
of Popular Testing Methods, N.Y. STATE B.J., July-Aug. 2003, at 19, 21-22.
129. See generally id.
130. Id. at 22.
131. Id.
132. Id. Erickson argues that "[s]everal studies have revealed that American adults with no
history of mental illness and living in the community, score in the maladjusted range when given
the Rorschach, including high scores on scales indicative of severe mental illness such as the
Schizophrenia Index." Id. at 23.
133. Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Mental Health Experts in Custody Decisions: Science,
Psychological Tests and Clinical Judgment, 36 FAM. L.Q. 135, 148 (2002). Shuman argues that
"[t]he Rorschach can provide a good understanding of the adult's affect, organization skills, and
reality testing, but, except for the most dysfunctional parent, it will not do much to answer ques-
tions about day-to-day parenting." Id. See also STAHL, supra note 102, at 55.
134. The MMPI consists of 550 affirmative statements that a person must answer either true,
false, or "cannot say." MURPHY & DAVISHOFER, supra note 126, at 87. The MMPI-2, the rede-
signed version of the test, now contains 567 statements. Id. See also Shuman, supra note 133, at
144. This test evaluates a person on ten clinical scales. Id.
135. JONATHAN W. GOULD, CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFTED CHILD CUSTODY EVAL-
UATIONS 201 (1998).
136. Id.
137. Shuman, supra note 133, at 146.
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and the United States and state supreme court decisions that pro-
vide litigants a tool to challenge the admissibility of expert evidence,
the paucity of reported decisions addressing whether, when, or how
the MMPI may be used in custody evaluations is shocking.' 38
Despite these problems, MMPI results are contained in almost every
child abuse and neglect file.' 39
C. Current Status: Judicial Deference to Mental
Health Professionals
Much recent literature criticizes the deference given to mental
health professionals in the realm of child custody cases, specifically in
divorce cases. Shuman has suggested that "[s]ubtly, without fanfare
or hoopla, the role of mental health professionals in custody litigation
is being transformed from expert as expert to expert as judge." 140
Shuman argues that transformation is inappropriate because the in-
creased weight given to mental health expert testimony is based on
flawed notions about its reliability and on antiquated notions devel-
oped by Sigmund Freud and his supporters. 141 Shuman advocates for
increased pre-admission scrutiny: "If society wishes to use mental
health practitioners as experts in child custody cases, then law and
science demand rigorous threshold scrutiny of their methods and pro-
cedures so that courts are informed consumers of this evidence.' 142
D. Case Studies
This section examines four Illinois child abuse and neglect cases
that illustrate one or more problems with overreliance on psychologi-
cal testimony. These problems include the following: Psychiatrists
overestimating their predictive abilities, overreliance on a single psy-
chological test, and unwillingness to question the foundation for ex-
perts' opinions.
1. In re B.D. v. J.T.: Differing Diagnoses Treated the Same
In re B.D. v. J.T143 involved a mother's appeal from a trial court's
order finding her unable to care for her children Brianna and Brian. 44
The order made the children wards of the court and appointed them a
138. Id.
139. This was the author's own personal observation as an intern with the Illinois Cook
County Office of the Public Guardian during the summer of 2003.
140. Shuman, supra note 133, at 160.
141. Id. at 157-60.
142. Id. at 162.
143. 746 N.E.2d 822 (111. App. Ct. 2001).
144. Id. at 823.
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DCFS guardian. 45 The case first came to court when Brianna was
brought to the hospital for a stomach injury. 46 The hospital investi-
gated and the child claimed that the mother's husband had kicked her
in the stomach. 147
Dr. Michael Fernando performed a full psychiatric evaluation of the
mother at the request of the mother's caseworker who was concerned
about the mother's depressive symptoms. 148 After one meeting, Dr.
Fernando provided a tentative diagnosis: "[B]ipolar II disorder, cyclo-
thymic disorder and major depressive disorder recurrent with psycho-
sis." '1 4 9 The doctor prescribed mood-stabilizing medication. 150 The
mother did not take the prescribed medication, and at another meet-
ing one month later, the doctor made a final diagnosis of bipolar II
disorder and again recommended medication.151
A clinical psychologist, Sidney St. Leger, performed a psychological
evaluation of the mother. 152 The purpose of the psychological evalua-
tion was to assess her ability to function effectively as a parent.153 St.
Leger diagnosed her with "borderline personality disorder" 154 and
recommended therapy and parenting classes. 155 He recommended su-
pervised contact between the mother and her children until these ser-
vices were completed. 156
The child welfare agency supervisor, Marla Lawrence, also testified
to the mother's compliance with therapy and other services recom-
mended by the agency. 15 7 The supervisor further stated that the
mother had "visited the minors and made progress in therapy. '1 58
The supervisor testified that "she felt the tension between Dr. Fer-
nando and [the mother] had colored Dr. Fernando's evaluation of [the
mother] and considered sending [the mother] to another doctor for a
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 824.
149. In re B.D., 746 N.E.2d at 824.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. In re B.D., 746 N.E.2d at 824.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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second opinion."159 She never sent the mother to a different doctor,
but did recommend that the children be returned home. 60
The trial court made the children wards of the court and expressed
its displeasure with the agency's recommendation that the children re-
turn home. t 61 It found the testimony of Dr. Fernando "very credi-
ble. 1 62 Furthermore, the court noted that "[the mother] never
presented any medical evidence to contradict his medical opinion.' 63
The court cited to Ashley K and reaffirmed that expert medical testi-
mony cannot be contradicted by other types of testimony such as that
proffered by the agency worker.164
On appeal, the mother challenged the lower court's reliance on Dr.
Fernando's testimony. 165 The mother claimed that Dr. Fernando "was
not a parenting expert, he did not contradict Lawrence's testimony of
[the mother's] fitness and St. Leger diagnosed [the mother] as having
a different disorder not requiring medication.' ' 166 The appellate court
quickly disposed of these claims. First, it noted that Dr. Fernando
evaluated the mother in his capacity as a psychiatrist, not as a parent-
ing expert. Second, the court pointed out that Lawrence had insuffi-
cient knowledge to contradict Dr. Fernando's medical opinion.
Third, as to the differing diagnoses, the court stated, "But while his
diagnosis may have been different, it was not contradictory."' 167 How-
ever, this ignores the substantial difference between bipolar II disor-
der and borderline personality disorder. 168 The differences between
159. Id.
160. Id. Lawrence had been assigned to the case only a few weeks and had never seen the
mother together with the children, nor did she know where the mother was living. In re B.D.,
746 N.E.2d at 824.
161. Id. at 825.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 826.
165. Id.
166. In re B.D., 746 N.E.2d at 826.
167. Id. at 827.
168. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) presents the fol-
lowing diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder:
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects,
and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of con-
texts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following: (1) frantic efforts to avoid real or
imagined abandonment .... (2) a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal rela-
tionships ... (3) identity disturbance . .. (4) impulsivity in at least two areas that are
potentially self-damaging .... (5) recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or
self-mutilating behavior (6) affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood ...
(7) chronic feelings of emptiness (8) inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty control-
ling anger . . . (9) transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative
symptoms.
[Vol. 54:971
2005] PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS
the two disorders should have been examined before making a deter-
mination regarding the child's best interests.
Fourth, the diagnoses should not have been offered at all without an
explanation of both their definitions and a discussion of how the diag-
noses relate to parenting capacity. In Conducting Child Custody Eval-
uations: A Comprehensive Guide, scholar Philip Michael Stahl
discusses how to perform and write an effective evaluation. 169 He sug-
gests that technical diagnoses should be used minimally and that such
reports should instead emphasize descriptive language. °70 For exam-
ple, a judge should be told that "the father is volatile, externalizes
blame, denies any wrongdoing on his part.., rather than just be told
that the father has a Borderline Personality Disorder. 171
Despite the caseworker mentioning the negative relationship be-
tween Dr. Fernando and the mother, the appellate court never dis-
cussed the issue. 172 The therapeutic or clinical relationship between
the parties did not appear to be part of Dr. Fernando's report or testi-
mony.173 Scholars James Bow and Francella Quinnell express concern
about such a lack of "clinical description of the parties. ' 174 Such a
description is critical because information about a parent's presenta-
tion and the nature of the interactions with the evaluator are crucial to
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Assoc., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 654
(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. In contrast, bipolar II disorder has the following main
diagnostic criteria: (1) the "[p]resence (or history) of one or more major Depressive Episodes;"
and (2) the "[p]resence (or history) of at least one Hypomanic Episode." Id. at 362. A Hypo-
manic Episode is "[a] distinct period of persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood, last-
ing throughout at least 4 days, that is clearly different from the usual nondepressed mood." Id.
at 338.
169. See generally STAHL, supra note 102. For a discussion of the need for a standardized
protocol in child custody evaluations by mental health experts, see Stephen P. Herman, Child
Custody Evaluations and the Need for Standards of Care and Peer Review, 1 J. CENTER FOR
CHILD. & CTS. 139 (1999).
170. STAHL, supra note 102, at 85.
171. Id. See also NAT'L INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLOQUIUM ON CHILD CUSTODY, LEGAL AND
MENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD CUSTODY LAW: A DESKBOOK FOR JUDGES 321
(1998) [hereinafter NAT'L COLLOQUIUM] (suggesting that evaluators refrain from using DSM-IV
diagnoses without a discussion about the impact such a diagnosis would have on a person's
parenting abilities).
172. See generally id.
173. See generally id.
174. James N. Bow & Francella A. Quinnell, A Critical Review of Child Custody Evaluation
Reports, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 164, 172 (2002). Bow and Quinnell examined fifty-two child custody
reports (seemingly from the divorce context). Id. at 166. Of these, fifty percent did not contain
a "clinical description of the parties." Id. at 172. They also found that fifteen percent did not
interview "collateral contacts" (i.e., person's therapist, friends, coworkers) despite the impor-
tance of this in the "hypothesis testing process." Id. They also found that two evaluators had
previously "served in a therapeutic role with the families they evaluated, a situation that is con-
trary to forensic guidelines regarding multiple relationships." Id. at 171.
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developing and testing theories. 175 This is especially important in cus-
tody evaluations because these situations are so emotionally
charged.' 76 The stress involved with such a process often causes par-
ties to appear at their worst. 177 Consequently, this information must
be included in any complete evaluation report. 178
2. In re I.D.: Generalizations About the Relationship of IQ to
Parenting
In In re I.D., 1 79 the appellate court upheld the termination of the
mother's parental rights1 80 despite her compliance with recommended
services. 18' A clinical psychologist, Dr. Ronald Matthew, assessed the
mother's intelligence quotient (IQ)182 at fifty-three 183 and recom-
mended against returning the child home despite the strong bond that
existed between mother and child. 84 Dr. Matthew seemingly based
his conclusions on what an IQ of fifty-three generally means for an
175. Id. at 172.
176. Bow & Quinnell, supra note 174.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 563 N.E.2d 1200 (I11. App. Ct. 1991), overruled on other grounds by In re R.C., 745
N.E.2d 1233 (Ill. 2001).
180. Jd. at 1202. The termination petition "alleged that she is unfit in that she is unable to
discharge her parental responsibilities due to a mental impairment, and that there is sufficient
justification to believe that such inability to discharge parental responsibilities shall extend be-
yond a reasonable time. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(p).)." Id.
181. Id. at 1200, 1208. I.D. had originally been removed from the home when she was two
years old. Id. at 1202. Evidence showed that the father had sexually abused two older females
while I.D. was living there, and because of the mother's mental deficiencies, she was unable to
protect I.D. Id. Accordingly, the court found I.D. was abused in that her living environment
was injurious to her welfare. In re I.D., 563 N.E.2d at 1202.
182. The DSM-IV states that IQ is a measure of general intellectual functioning measured by
a standardized intelligence test. See DSM-IV, supra note 168. Furthermore,
[slignificantly subaverage intellectual functioning is defined as an IQ of about 70 or
below .... It should be noted that there is a measurement error of approximately 5
points in assessing IQ, although this may vary from instrument to instrument .... The
choice of testing instruments and interpretation of results should take into account fac-
tors that may limit test performance (e.g., the individual's sociocultural background,
native language, and associated communicative, motor, and sensory handicaps).
Id. at 39-40.
183. Fifty-three falls between the mild/moderate mental retardation division. Id. at 40. But
the DSM-IV states that in order to diagnose mental retardation, the IQ result must be coupled
with
[cloncurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the per-
son's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her
cultural group) in at least two of the following areas: communication, self-care, home
living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.
Id. at 46.
184. In re I.D., 563 N.E.2d at 1202.
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individual's mental capacity instead of evaluating the facts of the case.
His actions conflicted with APA guideline thirteen: "Psychologists in-
terpret any data from interviews or tests cautiously and conserva-
tively, strive to be knowledgeable about cultural norms and present
findings in a form understandable to the recipient. s18 5 Even under the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), a
diagnosis of mental retardation cannot be made solely on the results
of an IQ test.186 Pure IQ results may or may not correlate with
parenting ability, and the court should have examined this issue more
closely before permanently severing the parent-child relationship.
In addition to testifying that he worried about how the mother
would handle emergency situations, Dr. Matthew's report stated that
"research shows children growing up in those homes where poor ma-
ternal care and lack of stimulation existed could show an IQ decrease
of up to 30 points."187 Dr. Matthew said that although the mother had
made great improvements in specific areas of functioning, she still
functioned at the level of a thirteen-year-old.188 The opinion men-
tioned that I.D. suffered from developmental delays and that these
delays decreased while she was in foster care.189 While this may have
been true, there was no evidence presented to show that social ser-
vices could not have helped the mother to provide appropriate stimu-
lating activities. 190 Regarding intellectual stimulation, scholar Robert
Hayman, Jr. concedes that a mentally retarded parent may be less
able to initially provide this stimulation.' 91 But Hayman suggests that
intervention should be able to improve this and cautions against
equating a nonoptimal intellectual environment with an entirely defi-
cient environment. 92 Mentally retarded persons may compensate for
this in other areas. 193
Because I.D. was young, Dr. Matthew thought that the child would
be able to deal with the separation if she were placed into a perma-
nent home. 194 DCFS, in contrast, recommended that the court should
185. APA, supra note 92, at Guideline 13. See also sources cited supra notes 92-102 and
accompanying text.
186. See supra note 183.
187. In re I.D., 563 N.E.2d at 1206.
188. Id. at 1207.
189. Id. at 1206.
190. See generally id.
191. In re I.D., 563 N.E.2d at 1222.
192. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded
Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1222 (1990).
193. See generally id.
194. In re I.D., 563 N.E.2d at 1207.
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not terminate the mother's parental rights.195 The appellate court had
a limited opportunity to review the lower court's findings and stated
that "great deference is given to the findings of the trial court since
the judge had the opportunity to view the witnesses and evaluate the
testimony."1 96 Also, the appellate court made no mention of parent-
child observations. Dr. Matthew may not have even observed the
mother with her daughter I.D. Dr. Matthew testified, "In regard to
being a parent, it was his opinion that she would be quite limited, and
would be subject to poor judgment and deficiencies in being able to
communicate.' 197 His testimony did not make clear whether his opin-
ion was based on actual observation or speculation based on his as-
sessment of her IQ.
3. In re J.J. and T.R.: Critical Omission of Parent-Child
Observation
In the case of In re J.J. and T.R.,198 the mother appealed the court's
order granting permanent, private guardianship for her children. 199
The children were first placed in temporary custody with DCFS in
1997 because one of the children, T.R., took several antidepressant
pills and lapsed into a coma.200 The mother gave T.R. castor oil, put
her to sleep, and only called an ambulance three hours later when the
child had difficulty breathing.20 The court granted custody to DCFS
and placed the child with relatives. 20 2
A psychological examination conducted in 1997 assessed the
mother's IQ 203 at sixty-seven 20 4 and recommended against awarding
the mother primary care of her children because of her various mental
deficiencies. 20 5 The examination stated that
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1205 (citing In re R.M.B., 496 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
197. Id. at 1202.
198. 761 N.E.2d 1249 (I11. App. Ct. 2001).
199. Id. at 1251.
200. Id.
201. Id. At the temporary custody hearing, the parties stipulated that in 1993 another child,
J.R., had been permanently injured when he shot himself with a gun that was on the floor. Id.
In 1991, another child of the mother died at the hands of her biological father. Id.
202. In re J.J., 761 N.E.2d at 1251.
203. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
204. Sixty-seven falls at the high end of mild mental retardation if it is accompanied by the
requisite characteristics. See supra note 183. The DSM-IV states that individuals classified as
mildly mentally retarded "usually achieve social and vocational skills adequate for minimum
self-support, but may need supervision, guidance, and assistance, especially when under unusual
social or economic stress." Id. at 41.
205. In re J.J., 761 N.E.2d at 1251.
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[L.W.] should not be assuming primary care of her children, as she
does not have the intellectual or personality resources to be an ef-
fective caretaker. It is advised that another close family member,
relative or friend assume this job. By placing [L.W.] in a position of
responsibility and/or authority, the children's safety and well-being
remain at risk.
20 6
By 1999, the case goal had been changed from "return home" 207 to
"private guardianship" 20 8 with the aunt and uncle.20 9
The mother's former therapist, Edward Landreth, testified at her
hearing. On direct examination, he testified that "he had terminated
therapy because she 'could not grasp the concept of psychother-
apy."210 He also testified that the mother suffered from dysthymic
disorder. 211 He recommended against returning the children home.
212
On cross-examination, Landreth revealed the following informa-
tion:213
[H]e made his recommendations regarding placement of the chil-
dren without observing respondent interact with them. In fact, he
never observed her interact with anyone. Landreth testified that
dsythymic disorder is generally treated with individual psychother-
apy and although there could be medical intervention, such inter-
vention was more common with other types of depression. He was
unaware of whether a psychiatric evaluation was ever prepared re-
garding respondent and admitted that such an evaluation might
have shown that she was eligible for medical treatment. Landreth
206. Id. at 1251 (quoting the report of L.W.'s psychological evaluation).
207. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28(2)(a) (2001).
208. Id. § 2-28(2)(e).
209. In re J.J., 761 N.E.2d at 1252.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1253. The DSM-IV presents the following diagnostic criteria for dysthymic
disorder:
A. Depressed mood for most of the day, for more days than not, as indicated either
by subjective account or observations of others, for at least 2 years .... B. Presence,
while depressed, of two (or more) of the following: (1) poor appetite or overeating (2)
insomnia or hypersomnia (3) low energy or fatigue (4) low self-esteem (5) poor concen-
tration or difficulty making decisions (6) feelings of hopelessness.
See DSM-IV, supra note 168, at 349. Also, the criteria state that the symptoms have never
abated for more than two months at a time, and no major depressive episode has been present
during the first two years. Id.
212. For a discussion of the child protection systems' improper reliance on labels rather than
individualized determinations of parental abilities, see Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act and the Parental Rights of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or
Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1415 (1995). Watkins suggests that judges often do not
realize the "nonobvious strengths" of a parent labeled mentally retarded. Id. at 1419. The au-
thor advocates applying the Americans with Disabilities Act to such situations in order to ensure
fair treatment. See generally id.
213. In re J.J., 761 N.E.2d at 1253.
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admitted that he did not establish a therapeutic relationship2 14 with
respondent and that she might have progressed better if she had
been referred to a different therapist.215
Thus, Landreth's testimony contained several questionable elements.
First, he never observed the mother with the children. Scholars
Bow and Quinnell suggest that "child custody guidelines [] stress the
importance of evaluating the interaction between child and parent. To
neglect such a procedure in a child custody evaluation would seem
indefensible. ' '216 Parent-child observations can reveal positive parent-
ing behaviors, such as "parental teaching, positive reinforcement, and
reasonable reciprocity in interactions with children, as well as the use
of age-appropriate language." 21 7 Such positive parenting behaviors
are best discovered through direct observation.
Second, Landreth's use of a technical diagnosis without explanation
misled the court. Dysthymic disorder is a persistent low-level of de-
pression that never rises to the level of a major depressive episode.218
Since dysthymic disorder can be treated with medication, Landreth
was remiss in not sending the mother to a psychiatrist for a medical
evaluation. 21 9 His use of the technical diagnosis without an accompa-
nying explanation did not effectively assist the trier of fact.220
Third, Landreth admitted that he never established a therapeutic
relationship with the mother.22 1 The mother testified that during ses-
sions, "[Landreth] told her that he could not help her, that she needed
an attorney, and that DCFS wanted to take her children. '222 After
Landreth terminated therapy, the mother sought counseling with her
pastor and attended counseling once a week for seven months.223
Since Landreth admitted the shortcomings in his working relationship
214. The therapeutic relationship can be described in different ways, but one way of looking
at it is the human relationship between therapist and client: "[T]he therapist is still presumably
an expert; but, if he or she is not first of all a human being, the expertness will not only be
irrelevant, but even harmful.... [I]f the patient is viewed as an object, the patient will tend to
become an object." 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 790 (Michael Hersen & William
Sledge eds., 2002).
215. In re J.J., 761 N.E.2d at 1253-54.
216. Bow & Quinnell, supra note 174, at 174; see also NAT'L COLLOQUIUM, supra note 171.
Chapter 25, Evaluating Custody Evaluations, suggests that failure to interview all involved par-
ties and to observe parents with the children should alarm the judge and merit further inquiry.
Id.
217. Daniel J. Hynan, Parent-Child Observations in Custody Evaluations, 41 FAM. CT. REV.
214, 218 (2003).
218. See supra note 211.
219. In re J.J., 761 N.E.2d at 1254.
220. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 214.
222. In re J.J., 761 N.E.2d at 1254.
223. Id.
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with the mother, he should have referred her to another therapist in-
stead of testifying that she did not grasp the concept of therapy.
224
Despite these problems, the court placed great weight on Lan-
dreth's testimony. The court also seemed to place great weight on
Landreth's credentials; Landreth had masters' degrees in both clinical
social work and clinical psychology and was finishing his doctorate
degree in psychology.2 25 Mere academic credentials, however, do not
ensure reliable methodology.226 The lower court should have care-
fully scrutinized Landreth's methodology before allowing him to tes-
tify that the children should not return home to their mother.
4. In re J.L.: Psychological Theory of Parenting
The court relied on an outdated and unsupported theory when it
prevented a child from reuniting with his mother in the case of In re
J. L. 227 In this case, a mother appealed an order requiring long-term
foster care for her son, J.L., because she wanted him to return
home.228 In 1991, J.L. and his siblings were removed from their
mother's home due to her drug and alcohol problems.
229 After a
failed placement with his maternal grandmother, J.L. was placed with
his paternal grandmother in Wisconsin.2 30 During the next two years,
the mother engaged in the following services: inpatient and outpatient
treatment, Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, parenting classes, and
counseling. 231 The court ordered some of these services and the
mother initiated others.232 Based on the success of the supervised vis-
its, which progressed into unsupervised visits, the mother's
caseworker eventually recommended moving towards the goal of re-
turning the children home.
233
A social worker, however, disagreed with the caseworker's recom-
mendation. At the hearing, the court admitted into evidence a report
written by Dr. Linn McIntyre, a doctorate-level clinical social
worker.234 Dr. McIntyre's report stated that the foster grandmother
was J.L.'s "psychological mother, ' 235 and further stated that "[t]o tear
224. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
225. See generally In re J.J., 761 N.E.2d 1249.
226. See infra note 242.
227. 721 N.E.2d 638 (I11. App. Ct. 1999).
228. See generally id.
229. Id. at 640.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 650.
233. In re J.L., 721 N.E.2d at 641.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 642.
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J.L. from his grandmother would do him irreparable harm: [H]e
would be forced to adjust externally, but the internal loss would affect
him profoundly. '236
After the hearing, the court made several rulings.237 One ruling
stated that "[i]t was not appropriate to return J.L. home because of
the irreparable harm he would suffer. '238 The appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment and cited In re C.B.:239 "Although a
trial court is not compelled to follow the recommendations of an ex-
pert in custody matters, qualified and competent medical testimony
concerning the child for whom the custody decision is being made
must not be disregarded when determining what is in that child's best
interest. " 240
The appellate court did not question the basis for the expert's opin-
ion.24 1 The court pointed out that tie expert had a doctorate degree,
but did not further analyze her experience in the field. 242 Further-
more, the court did not question the expert's reliance on the psycho-
logical parent theory. 243 The psychological parent theory developed
through the work of Freud and other psychoanalysts. 244 This theory,
as scholars Daniel Krauss and Bruce Sales pointed out, states that the
person "who provided for the child's environmental stability, emo-
tional needs, and affection needs was considered to be the psychologi-
cal parent, deserving exclusive custody. ' 245 In this case, no mention
was made about the reliability of this type of testimony.246 Since the
expert did not take the stand, there was no cross-examination. 247 One
commentator suggests that the entire theory of the psychological par-
236. Id. The report also stated that "[a] psychological evaluation done in October 1994 indi-
cated that respondent had a dysphoric or depressed mood that she often denied or repressed."
Id. at 641. The evaluation was performed four years ago and the record did not indicate whether
respondent had progressed in this area through medication or therapy. See generally id.
237. In re J.L., 721 N.E.2d at 642.
238. Id.
239. See generally In re C.B., 618 N.E.2d 598.
240. In re J.L., 721 N.E.2d at 642 (citing In re C.B., 618 N.E.2d 598).
241. See generally id.
242. Id. at 641. One commentator suggests that a court "need not accept experience standing
alone as sufficient to qualify the psychologist as an expert when the experience is common-
place." Carolyn R. Wah, The Changing Nature of Psychological Expert Testimony in Child Cus-
tody Cases, 86 JUDICATURE 152, 155 (2002).
243. See generally id.
244. Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, Legal Standards, Expertise and Experts in the Reso-
lution of Contested Child Custody Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 843, 847 (2000).
245. Id.
246. See generally In re J.L., 721 N.E.2d 638.
247. Id.
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ent developed "[l]argely on the basis of empirically unsupported psy-
choanalytic theory.52 48
Thus, despite the mother's compliance with services, negative re-
sults on drug and alcohol tests, and the recommendations of her
caseworker, the goal remained long-term foster care.2 49 The court re-
lied on the testimony of one licensed social worker in determining that
long-term placement with a relative who did not wish to adopt J.L.
was better than returning the child home.
250
This decision directly contradicts the Stanley v. Illinois principle that
no interest is served by separating "children from the custody of fit
parents. '251 The mother's drug tests had been negative for three
years.25 2  She lived on her own and had been consistently
employed.25 3
5. Lessons Learned
The preceding analysis explored some ways in which court opinions
discuss the weight to be given to psychological testimony. Perhaps the
results of these cases would have been the same if the testimony was
either not admitted into evidence or given less weight. However, the
importance of the parent-child relationship requires that decisions in-
terfering with that relationship be based on correct interpretation of
the evidence presented.
IV. IMPACT: USING DAUBERT
This section discusses the advantages of using the Daubert test, now
encompassed in the amended Rule 702,254 to determine the admissi-
bility of mental health reports and testimony in Illinois child abuse
and neglect cases. First, the use of Daubert would require judges to
determine whether the proposed testimony is scientific. Second, con-
ducting inquiries into the reliability of the methodology used would
give judges a more in-depth basis of knowledge. Third, Daubert anal-
248. Krauss & Sales, supra note 244, at 847. See generally Theresa A. Nitti, Comment, Step-
ping Back from the Psychological Parenting Theory: A Comment on In re J.C., 46 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1003 (1994). Nitti discusses the foundation for this theory, its weaknesses, and how those
weaknesses affected the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re J.C., 608 A.2d 1312 (N.J. 1992).
249. In re J.L., 721 N.E.2d at 864.
250. Id.
251. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652; see supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
252. In re J.L., 721 N.E.2d at 641.
253. Id. It is also interesting to note that the court chose to cite In re C.B., when that case
rejected very similar abstract theories and reversed a decision made in reliance on such princi-
ples. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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ysis would facilitate decisionmaking in accordance with the Supreme
Court's recognition of the importance of parent-child bonds.
A. Daubert's First Inquiry: Is This Scientific?
Daubert first requires a judge to ask whether an expert is going to
testify to scientific knowledge. 255 In cases involving mental health tes-
timony, the answer is frequently no.256 The concept seems simple, yet
without this first inquiry, judges might take for granted that the testi-
mony is indeed scientific.2 57 Asking the question, "Is this scientific?"
and answering "No," would most likely cause a judge to place signifi-
cantly less weight on the testimony. 258
As one scholar points out, mental health professionals who testify
regarding observations made about the parent-child relationship are
not testifying to scientific knowledge.259 As scholars Thomas Gionis
and Anthony Zito, Jr. note, "There is no research to support the pro-
position that mental-health professional expert guided child-custody
placements are better than those where children are placed without
the benefit of an expert. '260
Asking the question, "Is this scientific?" would also force judges to
analyze whether the expertise of mental health professionals allows
them to render better decisions than the judge's own. 261 Shuman
questions the deference afforded to mental health professionals'
testimony:
If less rigorous scrutiny of mental health professional's clinical infer-
ence about the best interests of the child turns on a belief that
mental health professionals possess some special predictive abilities
according to a nonstandardized metric, an abdication of careful ju-
dicial assessment of the scientific validity of the reasoning or meth-
odology underlying their testimony is misplaced. 262
If a judge realized that the proferred testimony is based more on opin-
ion than sound scientific reasoning, the judge might be more inclined
255. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text. See generally H. Joseph Gitlin, Mental-
Health Professionals in Child-Custody Cases: Giving "Expert" Testimony Its Due, 89 ILL. B.J. 350
(2001).
256. Id. "In cases where a mental-health professional is testifying to what witnesses observed
about the relationship between the parent and child, usually the expert is not testifying as to
scientific knowledge." Id. at 354.
257. Id. Gitlin suggests that appellate court opinions and other evidence demonstrate that
this is the case. Id.
258. Id.
259. Gitlin, supra note 255, at 354.
260. Gionis & Zito, supra note 56, at 4.
261. See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
262. See Shuman, supra note 106, at 567.
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to afford more weight to testimony from others, such as caseworkers.
The judge's final decision might then be based on a combination of his
or her own opinion about the child's best interests and the testimony
of others.
As Shuman points out, when expert testimony is based on values
relating to personal biases, heuristics, or other improper decisionmak-
ing mechanisms, judicial deference is not justified.2 63 Judicial defer-
ence is only justified when the testimony is based on research that is
grounded in sound methodology and subjected to peer review.2 64
Gould suggests that mental health professionals may make judgments
that are less accurate than those made by judges or laypeople because
clinical experience tends to create greater biases and more unfavora-
ble prognoses. 265
Given these difficulties, mental health professionals should not be
allowed to render opinions on the ultimate issues in the cases. Also,
"[s]ome commentators have argued that psychologists and other
[mental health professionals] have no expertise in assessing a child's
best interest and, consequently, that it is unethical for psychologists to
offer 'expert' opinions that have no real scientific basis. '266 Perhaps
"[mental health professionals] should still refrain from offering expert
testimony advocating a particular custodial arrangement for a specific
child. ' 267 If they do advocate a particular arrangement, the judge
should take great care not to substitute a clinician's opinion for the
judge's own opinion.
B. The Individual Daubert Factors
If the testimony is scientific, the judge would then evaluate the ad-
missibility of the proposed testimony according to the individual
Daubert factors: (1) Whether methodology has or can be tested; (2)
263. See id. at 566.
264. Id. Gould explains the proper role of the evaluation process:
We are but sophisticated guides for the trier of fact through a confusing array of psy-
chological technology, a technology never intended for use in custodial assessment.
Through our learned and judicious use of psychological theories, methods, and data
gathering, we determine our best guesses possible. Our tools are often not valid for
custodial assessment. Our models are often rationally, not empirically, derived. And
our opinions are more educated guesses than truth. We need to be careful in how we
present our data and opinions to the court so as not to mislead.
GOULD, supra note 135, at 38.
265. Id.
266. Krauss & Sales, supra note 244, at 863 (referring to M. Lavin & B. Sales, Moral Justifica-
tions for Limits on Expert Testimony, in EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT
CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT? (S. Seci & H. Hembrook eds., 1998)).
267. Id. at 874.
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whether the theory or techniques has been subjected to peer review
and publication; (3) the known or potential error rate; and (4)
whether the theory or methodology has obtained general acceptance
in the scientific community.2 68
Scholars William Grove and Christopher Barden discuss the way
this might impact mental health testimony, using the Rorschach as an
example. 269 They argue that the Rorscach is able to be tested and
indeed has been tested.270 They assert, however, that the Rorschach is
not generally accepted, nor has its validity been subjected to adequate
peer review. 271 Grove and Barden then go on to note that despite
this, the Rorschach is infrequently challenged (only six challenges out
of 7,934 cases using such testimony, and only one successful) and ar-
gue that this is problematic because the Rorschach does not withstand
Daubert scrutiny. 272
C. Judicial Responsibility to Apply Daubert Despite Its Difficulty
Despite criticisms that judges are ill-equipped to evaluate scientific
methodology,2 73 using the Daubert factors would greatly improve the
quality of judicial decisions in the child abuse and neglect context. In
the Daubert decision, the Supreme Court realized that potential diffi-
culty, but charged judges with the appropriate application. 274 In a
sense, the Supreme Court justices urged their lower-court counter-
parts to gain the necessary knowledge and implied that lack of knowl-
edge about scientific principles provides no excuse for abdication.275
268. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
269. William M. Grove & R. Christopher Barden, Protecting the Integrity of the Legal System:
The Admissibility of Testimony from Mental Health Experts Under Daubert/Kumho Analysis, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 224, 227 (1999).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. See also Erickson, supra note 128. Erickson suggests that Rorschach is not generally
accepted, nor has it been peer reviewed, and also "that the Rorschach is not a reliable or valid
measure of many mental illnesses and does not measure what it purports to measure." Id. at 24.
273. See generally Montz, supra note 107. Montz discusses a Texas study relating to science
education for judges. The study found that among surveyed judges, ninety-two percent had re-
ceived some undergraduate education involving the scientific methodology, yet eighty-nine of
these judges admitted that this education occurred more than forty years ago. Id. at 111. Fifty-
eight percent of the Texas judges surveyed felt that law school inadequately prepared them to
evaluate the scientific method. Id. Seventy percent "reported no continuing education or practi-
cal business experience in the use and analysis of the reliability of scientific methodology." Id. at
111-12.
274. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
275. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
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D. Daubert Hearings: Benefits
Daubert hearings are necessary in judge-decided child abuse and
neglect cases. Forcing judges to conduct more Daubert/Kumho hear-
ings would have several important effects. First, judges would be re-
quired to raise questions that previously might have gone unasked. A
judge might have once assumed that the Rorschach tests were both
reliable and predictive. If, instead, judges are forced to question the
foundation of the Rorschach, they might open their eyes to criticisms
of the test.
Second, as judges conduct more of these hearings, their knowledge
base would increase. In future cases, when they heard expert mental
health testimony, they would be more aware of the strengths and
weaknesses of such testimony. They would become more aware of the
technical jargon and the evidentiary foundations for diagnoses and
predictions. For example, in the case In re J.L.,2 7 6 the judges at both
the trial and appellate levels would have been more familiar with the
diagnoses of both bipolar II disorder and borderline personality disor-
der, and would have been aware that they were in fact different diag-
noses. Consequently, the judges could have placed less emphasis on
the testimony of the experts or precluded its admission entirely.
Whether this would have mandated a different result is certainly ques-
tionable, but at least the courts' opinions would have been based on
complete information.
Third, conducting these hearings would raise the bar for agencies
that act as court-appointed evaluators. 277 If judges were continually
questioning and evaluating the quality of and foundation for the
agency's work, agencies would be forced to demand higher education
and performance standards from the experts. This would improve the
accuracy of the process and its outcomes for everyone involved.
E. The Supreme Court Revisited
The Supreme Court's holdings with regard to the parent-child rela-
tionship arguably demand stricter standards for the admission of ex-
pert testimony in child abuse and neglect cases. 278 The Supreme
Court has even referred to parental rights termination proceedings as
quasi-criminal. 279 Because the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaf-
firmed the importance of the parent-child relationship, standards for
276. See supra notes 227-253 and accompanying text.
277. DCFS contracts with mental health professionals to conduct psychological evaluations.
278. See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 25.
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the admission of expert testimony must reflect this importance. Al-
lowing the admission of expert testimony that does not meet the
Daubert test undermines the importance of the parent-child relation-
ship. Furthermore, the testimony must be based on valid, tested, and
peer reviewed methodologies before it can be used to interfere with
this constitutionally protected relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has placed an increasingly high
value on the parent-child relationship. At the same time, the Court
has placed increased scrutiny on the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. However, in Illinois, parents still face the threat of having their
children removed from their custody and having their parental rights
terminated without close scrutiny of the mental health testimony of-
fered against them. Psychological tests are still admitted into evidence
without discussions of their limitations and supporting methodologies.
Clinicians in these proceedings still disregard guidelines set forth by
their profession and overstep their authority by advocating against re-
turning a child to a parent's custody.
Rule 702280 must be adopted by the Illinois courts to deal with is-
sues of custody and the APA and AFCC guidelines must be followed.
In other areas of the law, the Frye test or a variation of Frye might
suffice, but this is simply not the case in child abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings. Interference with parental rights triggers constitutional
scrutiny and demands Daubert-level scrutiny for mental health testi-
mony. Daubert requires a judge to analyze the underlying methodol-
ogy before admitting evidence proffered by mental health
professionals. No parent should lose custody of a child without the
supporting evidence being carefully scrutinized.
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